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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW

By

QUINCY WRIGHT*

T IS not the writer's purpose to illustrate the system of international law by instances of its observance or violation
since August, 1914. This would require much more space than
he has at disposal and has been well done in the recent volumes
by Professor Garner.1 He hopes rather, to make a preliminary
effort toward stating the effect of the war on the international laNv
of peace, war and neutrality, though with full realization that
the time is not yet ripe for an adequate statement. The present
article deals with the law of peace.
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Writers generally hold that international law is founded on
agreement and reason. 2 Agreement may be tacit, evidenced by
practice which in time becomes usage. If adhered to from a
sense of legal obligation, usage becomes custom which is a source
of law.3 No practice can become undoubted custom in so short
a time as six years. Thus we will not be justified in assuming
that war practices have modified the law, though they may indicate a growing usage.
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
1J. W. Garner, International Law and the World War, 2 vols., London, 1920.
2"International law, as understood among civilized nations, may be
defined as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as
consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent." Wheaton, Elements of International Law,
Dana, ed., p. 23. See also Westlake, International Law, Cambridge, 1910,
1: 14. Grotius denominated that part of international law founded on
agreement "jus gentium" and that part founded on reason "jus naturale," (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena, secs. 1, 41), while Vattel
called that part founded on agreement "le droit des gens positif" divided
according as agreement is presumed, express, or tacit into "droit volontaire, conventionnel, et coutumier," and that part founded on reason
"droit des gens naturel ou necessaire." (Le Droit des Gens, Preliminaires,
sec. 27.) See Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed., London, 1920, sees.
54, 57, on the division of the "Grotians" into two schools, "the naturalists" and "the positivists" pinning their faith respectively on reason and
agreement. He notes that during the nineteenth century the positivists
tended to gain the upper hand. (Sec. 59.)
3
Oppenheim, op. cit., sec. 17.

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Agreement may also be express, evidenced informally by exchange of notes or formally by treaties and conventions. Only
formal agreements are sufficiently permanent to constitute a
source of international law. The peace treaties introduce certain
novelties into the system of international law and with them we
shall be concerned. 4 It must be remembered, however, that treaty
provisions are international law, only for the states that have
ratified the treaty, and that several important states, including
Russia, Mexico and the United States, have not ratified any portion of the peace treaties. The states which were neutral during
the war have for the most part acceded to the portions of the
peace treaties most affecting international law, those establishing
a League of Nations.'
Natural reason operates as a source of law. Those rules and
principles which in the opinion of a legally trained mind must
be observed if the existing international society is to persist are
valid law. 6 Put in another way, we may say that assuming certain fundamental purposes of the family of nations, those principles and rules which are necessary for securing them are law.
It is true that certain text writers deny the validity of this
source of international law,7 but nevertheless diplomats and
courts of arbitration appeal to reason,8 even more often than to
4
The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, (June 28, 1919), the Treaty
of St. Germain with Austria (Sept. 10, 1919), the Treaty of Neuilly with
Bulgaria (Nov. 27, 1919), and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary (June
4, 1920), each contains the League of Nations Covenant as the first 26
articles, as does presumably the Treaty of S~vres with Turkey (Aug. 10,
1920), though the latter has been neither ratified nor published. Peace
treaties have also been concluded by the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers with Poland (Versailles, June 28, 1919), Czecho-Slovakia (St.
Germain, Sept. 10, 1919), the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (St. Germain,
Sept. 10, 1919) and Roumania (Paris, Dec. 9, 1919). All of these treaties
except that of S~vres have been printed in full in the Supplements to the
American Journal of International Law from July, 1919, to Jan. 1921.
The Treaty of Versailles has also been published in the Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1919, with a convenient index. An
index has also been published by the British government as Treaty Series
(1920) No. 1. Official publications with French and English texts in parallel columns have been issued by the French, British and United States
governments, the latter as Sen. Doc. No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., and
in English
text alone as Sen. Doc. No. 49, ibid.
5
Supra note 49.
6
Westlake, op. cit. 1: 14-15.
7Oppenheim, op. cit., sees. 15, 59; Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,
(Higgins), pp. 1-2.
$As examples see belligerent arguments for right of retaliation even
though adversely affecting neutrals in German note, February 16, 1915,
and British Memorandum, April 24, 1916, sec. 38, (Department of State,
European War, 1: 57, 3: 77) and neutral reply in U. S. note, April 21,
1915, (Ibid. 1: 74-75). Mr. Carter's argument for the United States in
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custom, treaty and authority in the practical determination of
legal controversies.9 According to Bonfils :10
"Public international law proposes to reach a compromise between two actions, contrary in fact, that of the principle of
autonomy of states, and that of the notion of the cosmopolitan
society. Neither of these two principles ought to supplant the
other, nor to be put completely to its practical application."
With this conception of the ultimate purpose of international
law there seems to be substantial agreement among the writers:"
and there is no reason to believe that the war has altered it. Still
there is the ideal of national independence. Still there is the ideal
of a world society. We may assume the same fundamental principles of international law, though doubtless the experience of
the war has shown that a change of emphasis from rights to responsibilities is necessary to maintain them, and that new conditions caused by inventions, in means of communication and
transport, new instruments of warfare, and the more complete
organization of populations for war have rendered former dethe Behring Sea Arbitration of 1893 is largely based on pure reason.
International Arbitrations, 827 et seq.)
(1 Moore,
9
Since diplomats usually accept without question rules of law well
established by precedent, treaty or authority, controversies in practice
frequently hinge on points to sustain which reason plays a prominent part.
See Lawrence, Principles of International Law, sec. 10.
1OBonfils, Manuel de droit international public, 6th ed., (Fauchille)
Paris, 1912, sec. 24, p. 10.
""Both schools [national or negative, and cosmopolitan or positive]
profess to be advocates of peace, which the negative school hopes to
realize by the principle of absolute non-intervention; the positive school
by the principle of international organization carried to the extent of
regulating national as well as international legislation; whilst the 'peace
party,' rushing from the one extreme to the other, attempts to draw water
at both wells. But whilst hopelessly conflicting in isolation, these two
schools, when combined, become complementary; and it is their reconciliation, by the vindication of national freedom of action, not apart from,
but in and through the recognition of international dependence, which
constitutes the still very imperfectly solved problem of international law."
(1 Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, London, 1883, 11.) Writers
have often sought to reconcile these two aims of international law by a
rule closely resembling that posited by the individualistic school of ethics.
Thus Vattel says: "A nation is therefore free to act as it pleases, so far
as its acts do not affect the perfect rights of another Nation" (op. cit.
Prelim. sec. 20), and Westlake thinks: "International rules ought to be
made with due care that they shall not restrict liberty more than is necessary" (op. cit. 1: 18). With these compare Spencer: "Every man may
claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man." (Social Statics, chap. 4,
sec. 3.) See also Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 14; Thomasius, Fundamenta
juris naturae et gentium ex sensu communi deducta, ed. 1718, p. 213,
cited Lorimer, Institutes of Law, Edinburgh, 1872, p. 232; Kant, Principles
of Political Right, (Trans. Hastie, 1891), p. 36, and The Philosophy of
Law, (Tran. Hastie, 1887) p. 45, referred to Spencer, Justice, 1891,
Appdx. A, and Wright, The Enforcement of International Law, U. of
Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 5: 21-22.
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ductions obsolete and have made necessary a re-xamination of
many detailed rules.
Reason, as a source of law, may also be formalized in the
writings of preEminent scholars. 12 The rules deduced from principle and crystallized in the texts of Grotius, Vattel, Wheaton,
Bonfils, Hall, etc., rest on the same authority now that they did
seven years ago. This source of law has not been affected by the
war. It probably will increase our confidence in these writers
to observe the justness of some of their forecasts. Hall writes
in the preface of his third edition in 1889:13
"Looking back over the last couple of centuries we see international law at the close of each fifty years in a more solid position than that which it occupied at the beginning of the period.
• . . It would be idle to pretend that Europe is not now in
great likelihood moving towards a time at which the strength of
international law will be too hardly tried. Probably in the next
great war the questions which have accumulated during the last
half century and more, will all be given their answers at once.
Some hates moreover will crave for satisfaction; much envy and
greed will be at work; but above all, and at the bottom of all,
there will be the hard sense of necessity. Whole nations will
be in the field; the commerce of the world may be on the sea to
win or lose; national existences will be at stake; men will be
tempted to do anything which will shorten hostilities and tend to
a decisive issue. Conduct in the next great war will certainly
be hard; it is very doubtful if it will be scrupulous, whether on
the part of belligerents or neutrals; and most likely the next war
will be great. But there can be very little doubt that if the next
war is unscrupulously waged, it also -will be followed by a reaction towards greater stringency of law. .

.

. I therefore look

forward with much misgiving to the manner in which the next
great war will be waged, but with no misgiving at all as to the
character of the rules which will be acknowledged ten years after
its termination, by comparison with the rules now considered
to exist."
While custom and authority, by which the major part of
international law is firmly established, have not changed during
the war, the peace treaties and reason guided by recent experience may inform us what tendencies of international law have
been most stimulated by occurrences of the past six years.
12For classic statements of the authority of text writers in international law see Wheaton, op. cit. sec. 15, and Kent, Commentaries, 18,
cited with approval by Gray, J., in the Paquette Habana, (1899) 175
U. S. 677, 44 L. Ed. 320, 20 S. C. R. 290.
13Hall, International Law, 7th ed., pp. xx-xxi.
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THE SANCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

On December 28, 1915, Mr. Elihu Root called the attention
of the American Society of International Law to the serious
effect which the war then raging was having upon the very foun14
dations of international law.
"Whether or not" he said, "Sir Edward Carson went too far
in his recent assertion that the law of nations has been destroyed
it is manifest that the structure has been rudely shaken."
"The barriers that statesmen and jurists have been constructing laboriously for three centuries to limit and direct the conduct
of nations toward each other, in conformity to the standards of
modern civilization, have proved too weak to confine the tremendous forces liberated by a conflict which involves almost the
whole military power of the world and in which the destinies of
nearly every civilized state outside the American continents are
directly at stake. .

.

. For the present, at all events in all

matters which affect the existing struggle, international law is
greatly impaired."
With a retrospect of two years since the armistice can we
qualify this interpretation of then present events?
It must be evident that to enumerate violations of the rules
and principles of international law during the war and since,
however disconcerting to the student and disturbing to the faith
of the layman, is not to demonstrate the death or even the decadence of that body of law. Until the law has had a sufficient
opportunity to react with appropriate remedies and punishments,
whether by conscious judgments or natural consequences, we are
not entitled to proclaim its obsequies. If the remedy is complete,
the violation may ultimately demonstrate the vitality of the law.
"International laws violated with impunity" continues MVr. Root,
"must soon cease to exist," but international laws violated with
disaster may be strengthened. Yet with due consideration to the
remedies which have been exacted, the punishments which have
been meted out, the Nemesis which in many cases has followed
illegal action, it must be admitted that serious grounds exist for
questioning the sufficiency of the sanctions of international law.
We may investigate the progress made toward fulfillment of Mr.
Root's prophecy that:
"Vague and uncertain as the future must be, there is some
reason to think that after the terrible experience through which
14The Outlook for International Law, Proceedings, Ninth Annual meeting, American Society of International Law, 1915, p. 2.

See also Munroe

Smith, The Nature and the Future of International Law, Presidential
address American Political Science Association, Dec. 28, 1917, Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 12:8.
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civilization is passing there will be a tendency to strengthen rather
than abandon the law of nations."
International law is doubtless sanctioned in part by inertia
and habit. 15 Nations do as they have done because they lack originality to think of something new. So far as international law
is observed for this reason alone it resembles the scientist's "law
of nature." It is merely a generalization of past practice and
can not be violated, because a new departure merely changes the
law. So far as law is of this character it is descriptive and not
formative. As civilization has advanced and states have become
more self' conscious, their allegiance to habit has become less.
The experience of the war has shown that the highly organized
states of today do not blindly follow custom when important interests are at stake. Mere inertia is not likely in the future to
prevent rapid changes in the law.
If, leaving the scientist, we follow the humanist and conceive
of law as a guide for the conduct of intelligent beings, we find
that law which changes rapidly is not law at all. Law from the
humanist's point of view must be a permanent standard by which
conduct can be measured. What is it that induces nations to
conform their conduct to international law? Austin called international law "international public morality" and asserted that it
was sanctioned only by the moral sense of nations. 6 Others,
though denying its exclusiveness, have considered the moral sanction important.'" Hobbes and Grotius called the performance of
covenants a fundamental "law of nature,' 1 8 and others have asserted that respect for the obligations of contract is elementary
in morals, and the sine qua non of all society,' 9 yet the war began
15This is in varying degree true of all law. Maine speaks of a stage
"in the infancy of mankind" when "law has scarcely reached the footing
of custom; it is rather a habit." Ancient Law, p.-8.
161 Austin, Jurisprudence, 173, 226. See also 2 Stephen, History of
the Criminal Law, 25; Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, sec. 285.
'.Grotius, op. cit. Prolegomena, secs. 6-8; Vattel, op. cit. Preliminaires, sec. 7. "They (rules of international law) are enforced partly by
a conscientious conviction that they are good and right." Lawrence, The
Principles of International Law, sec. 9.
IsHobbes, Leviathan, chap. 15; Grotius, op. cit. Proleg., sec. 15. The
jurist's "law of nature" is of course different from the scientist's "law
of nature." See Lorimer, Institutes of Law, Introduction; Maine, Ancient
Law, chap. iv; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, chap. xi.
'9"Fundamentum justitiae est fides, id est dictorum conventorumque
constantia et veritas." (Cicero, de Off., 1: 9.) "Pour donner quelque
consistance au moral et quelque sfiret6 aux nations il faut supposer, par
pr~f6rance A tout le reste, deux points qui sont comme les deux p6les de
]a terre enti~re: l'un que tout trait6 de paix jur6 entre deux princes est
inviolable a leur 6gard." (Directions pour le Conscience d'un Roi, 6 Fen-
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by the conversion of a treaty to a scrap of paper, 20 continued
with repeated accusations of treaty repudiation 2' and ended by
allegations of a breach of the agreement on which the enemy laid
down his arms, in the opinion of some by the states which ratified the treaty of Versailles, 22 and, in the opinion of others, by the
state which refused to ratify.2 3 Machiavelli denied that nations
had any morals and was followed in effect by Frederick the
Great and Treitschke.2 Though few accept this harsh conclusion we may question whether, in view of recent experience the
world would not be naive to rely on the conscience of nations
law where important national
as a guarantee of international
25
interests are at stake.
elon, Oeuvres, 319, ed., 1810.)

"A treaty-breaking

state is the great.

enemy of nations, the. destroyer of their happiness, the obstacle of their
progress." (2 Phillimore, Commentary on International Law, 57.) "A
cardinal maxim of justice in all its forms, whether between man and
man, or between nation and nation is the maxim, 'keep faith.'" (Creasy,
First Platform of International Law, p. 40.) See also Hall, op. cit. p. 360.
2OSir Edward Goshen, British Ambassador at Berlin thus reports his
interview with Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4, 1914: "I
found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a
harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step
taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a
word--'neutrality'-a word which in war had so often been disregardedjust for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a
kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her."
British
Parl. Pap., Misc. No. 8, 1914; Garner, op. cit. 2: 192.
2
1See for example Austrian comment on Italian repudiation of the
Triple Alliance, (Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to
the Duke of Avarna, Italian Ambassador, May 21, 1915, Italian Green
Book, No. 77) and United States comment on the German repudiation
of "solemn assurance" to discontinue submarine warfare (Secretary of
State Lansing to Ambassador Gerard, Feb. 3, 1917, U. S. Dept. of State,
European War, 4: 409.) See also U. S. comment on German violations
of the treaty of 1828, Ibid., 4: 417. Charges by both belligerents of violation of the conventional law of war were of almost daily occurrence.
See especially protests against violations of the Geneva convention by
both belligerents and by. the International Committee of the Red Cross
at Geneva, Garner, op. cit. chap. xx, and p. 512.
Society
22
See Observations of the German delegation on the Conditions of
Peace, May 29, 1919, Official Summary, printed in Sen. Doc., No. 149,
66th Cong., 1st Sess., and printed in full, International Conciliation, Oct.
1919, No. 143. See also, Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the
Peace, N. Y. 1920, pp. 60-65.
234 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw, 35.
24Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. 18; Treitschke, Politics, (Eng. Trans.,
N. Y. 1916), chap. 3.
25
Examples of a cynical attitude toward treaties have not been wanting in the past. "Then the astonished Dutchmen asked, if the Hudson
River belonged to the King of England, in what light was the treaty of
Hartford to be regarded. As mere waste paper, was the reply; it had
never been ratified by any governing authority in England whether parliament, Lord Protector, or King." (1 Fiske, The Dutch and Quaker Colonies, ed. 1902, 327, with reference to treaty of Sept. 19, 1650.) "Treaties
at best are but complied with so long as interest requires their fulfill-
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But if nations will not observe law from the promptings of
conscience, will they not from an understanding of its utility?
"Natural Law," says Grotius, "is reinforced by utility."
ment; consequently they are virtually binding on the weaker part only,
or in plain truth they are not binding at all." (Irving, Knickerbocker
History of New York, book 5, chap. 4.) "Two centuries ago Spinoza
had avowed what Mackintosh terms 'the absurd and detestable maxim'
that states are not bound to observe their treaties longer than while the
interest or danger which first formed the treaties continues, but this
doctrine had, until lately, found few advocates in theory." (Creasy,
First Platform of International Law, London, 1876, p. 41.) "In a recent
historical work, Jdger's History of the Franco-Prussian war, I read
the following passage, which is evidently intended to annihilate me:
'Only a very narrow-minded politician could wonder that Prussia seized
that moment (1870) for breaking the treaty.' (Of Paris 1856 neutralizing the Black Sea). The historian probably did not contemplate the
application of that principle to Alsace." (2 von Beust, Memoirs, Eng.
Trans., London, 1887, 222.) "Did any impartial person blame Prussia
or Austria because, in 1813, they violated the treaties which bound them
to the first Napoleon, and not only did not fight in his ranks, as their
engagements required, but brought their whole military force into the
field against him, and pursued him to his destruction?

.

.

.

Yet it

was as true of those treaties as it is of the treaty of 1856, that, disadvantageous and dishonorable as they might be, they had been submitted
to as the purchase-money of peace, when the prolongation of war would
have been most disastrous. .

.

. If, though not fit to be perpetual,

(a

treaty) has been imposed in perpetuity, the question when it becomes
right to throw it off is but a question of time. No time having been
fixed, Russia fixed her own time, and naturally chose the most convenient. She had no reason to believe that the release she sought would
be voluntarily granted on any conditions which she would accept; and
she chose an opportunity which, if not seized, might have been long
before it occurred again, when the other contracting parties were in a
more than usually disadvantageous position for going to war." (J. S.
Mill, Treaty Obligations, Fortnightly Review, N. S. 1870, p. 715). "All
contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding, as
soon as they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great nation
will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to
contract when it is compelled to choose between the two." (2 Bismarck
Reflections and Reminiscences, London, 1898, 270). "A great nation does
not surrender what it possesses except under the pressure of extreme
necessity; all treaties making concessions are acknowledgements of such
a necessity, not moral obligations. If every people justly reckons it a
point of honour to tear to pieces by force of arms treaties that are disgraceful, how could honour enjoin patient adherence to a convention like
the Caudine to which an unfortunate general was morally compelled,
while the sting of the recent disgrace was keenly felt and the vigour
of the nation subsisted unimpaired?" (1 Mommsen, History of Rome, Bk.
2, chap. 6, Dickson's Trans., 377) "We must beware of judging a great
crisis from the advocates' Philistine standpoint. When Prussia broke
the Treaty of Tilsit the civil law would have pronounced her wrong,
but who would dare assert that she was guilty now? Not the French
themselves. This applies to international treaties less devoid of all
morality than that which Prussia was compelled to conclude with
France. Every state reserves to itself the right to be judge of its own
treaties, and the historian must not condemn, without searching deeper
to discover whether it is fulfilling its unqualified duty of self-maintenance." (Treitschke, Politics, English Trans. 1916, 1: 96.) See also Bernard, Lectures on Diplomacy, London, 1868, p. 85; 5 Moore, International
Law Digest, 338-341.
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"As a citizen," he continues, "who violates the civil law for
the sake of present utility, destroys that institution in which the
perpetual utility of himself and his posterity is bound up; so too
a people which violates the laws of nature and nations, beats
down the bulwark of its own tranquillity for future time. '2
To the same effect says Vattel :27
"The laws of the natural society of nations are so important
to the welfare of every state that if the habit should prevail of
treading them underfoot no nation could hope to protect its existence or its domestic peace, whatever wise and just and temperate measures it might take."
War, however, is itself the negation of society. Whatever
may be said of the international law of peace, can the law of war
be sanctioned by utility? It would seem that if the law of war
is of such character that violations inevitably react disastrously
upon the violator, it would be well sanctioned. The war witnessed
the working of this nemesis. Illegalities led to reprisals, atrocities stimulated recruiting, disregard for the fundamental rights
of neutrals made neutrals enemies. The history of the war is full
of evidence that violation of the law of war does not pay in
the long run.28
If violation of international law is inevitably against the long
run interest of the violator, then further enlightenment is the
only need, for the lives of states are long. They can afford to
forego a present advantage for a sure though distant gain.
Machiavellian statesmen and ruthless generals need instruction
as to the inevitable consequences of their acts rather than persuasion to be good. This may be true but the nemesis may be
far off. Even enlightened statesmen may be skeptical of its inevitableness." The war has not increased confidence in enlightened self-interest as a sanction for international law.
The sanction of municipal law is the force of organized society which quickens reason by making certain and swift the
consequences of violation of law, otherwise slow and vague. 0
Only by organization has positive law been maintained within the
2 Grotius, op. cit. Proleg., secs. 16, 18.
27
Vattel, op. cit. Prelim. sec. 22.
2sSee Garner on effect of devastation, op. cit. 1: 322; on effect of
air raids, 1: 488; on effect of deportations, 2:184 and Kellogg on effect
of terrorism, Atlantic Monthly, 122: 289, (Sept. 1918) Garner is of the
opinion that collective fines were effective in attaining their immediate
object,
2 2: 362.
9We may recall the Socratic paradox, that though Virtue is Knowledge, yet Virtue can not like Knowledge be taught. Plato, Protagoras
and Meno.
3ORoot, op. cit. Proc. Am. Soc. of Int. Law, 1915, pp. 4-5.

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

state. Anarchists alone have sufficient confidence in human nature to advocate an abandonment of police and courts,
substituting therefor a reliance upon moral sense and enlightened
selfinterest. Is philosophical anarchy more likely to be successful
outside of the state? Writers on international law have thought
not and have asserted the necessity of conscious sanctions.
Public opinion has been defended as a sufficient sanction."'
The
reality of its pressure is evident by the anxiety which belligerents showed to justify their acts before the world, but it has
not
proved sufficient in the face of determined policies of aggression.
The conviction growing from the war, that international
law
must be better sanctioned was realized in the peace treaties
by
the more definite organization of the family of nations
in a
League. Although compulsory settlement of legal controversies
is not provided for, yet all controversies must be submitted
to
either conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (art.
12)
under penalty of economic and military coercion by the League,
(art. 16) and if submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement
the award becomes enforceable by the League (art. 13).
The
financial liability of states (art. 231) and the penal liability
of
individuals for violations of the law of war (art. 228) was
also
definitely recognized by the treaty of Versailles.
I

THE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

A subject of international law has been defined as one "upon
whom [international] law confers rights and imposes duties."'
This does not, however, adequately distinguish between subjects
and objects of international law. Thus Westlake says "it
would
be pedantic to deny that the pirate and the blockade runner
are
subjects of international law"3 3 and Oppenheim's argument
denying that status to such individuals as well as heads of states
and
diplomatic officers seems to carry a suggestion of pedantry. 34
"If we look more closely into these rights, it becomes quite
obvious that they are not given to the favoured individual
by
the law of nations directly. For how could international
which is a law between states, give rights to individuals, law,
con3

'Root, The Sanctions of International Law, 2 Am. Journ.
of Int.
Law, 451, (1908). Mr. Root himself, however, most clearly
realized
the
insufficiency of this sanction in the address of 1915 just referred
to.
32
Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad,
N. Y.,
1915,33p. 16.
Westlake, Collected Papers on Public International Law, Cambridge,
1914,34p. 2.
Oppenheim, op. cit. 1: 457, 460.
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cerning their relations to a state? What the law of nations really
does concerning individuals is to impose the duty upon all the
members of the family of nations to grant certain privileges to
such foreign heads of states and diplomatic envoys, and certain
rights to such foreign citizens, as are on their territory. And,
corresponding to this duty, every state has by the law of nations
a right to demand that its head, its diplomatic envoys and its
citizens be granted certain rights by foreign states when on their
territory. Foreign states granting these rights to foreign individuals do this by their municipal laws, and these rights are,
therefore, not international rights, but* rights derived from municipal laws."
Perhaps the discussion can be taken out of the realm of
metaphysics if we confine the term subjects of international law
to those entities which are competent to appeal directly to established international processes for the enforcement of their rights
under international law. Recalling that international law consists of those rules and principles for the violation of which
35
states are responsible, we may conclude that subjects of international law include all entities, whether states, protectorates,
colonies, corporations, or individuals that can bring action by
some recognized and reasonably effective process against a state
(other than that of which it is a member or subject) to remedy
an alleged violation of its rights. Thus to determine what entities at any given time are subjects of international law we must
examine the condition of international organization. As Bor36
chard points out, the international prize court provided by the
XII Hague convention of 1907, if established would have made
individuals to a limited extent subjects of international law since
it afforded them recourse against belligerent states alleged to have
violated their rights on the high seas. The practice of diploinmatic protection of citizens abroad does not, however, render
their
although
because
law,
dividual subjects of international
rights and duties are measured by international law, yet they have
37

no recourse except by the grace of their government.

If,

however, an international court for the settlement of pecuniary
with
claims were established giving direct recourse to individuals
become,
would
persons
such
claims against foreign governments,
38
in so far, subjects of international law. Whether the recourse
35Wright, The Enforcement of International Law, p. 13.
3GBorchard, op. cit. p. 17.
37Ibid., pp. 356, 363.
38Such a court has often been recommended. Borchard op. cit. pp.
328, 373, 443, 864; Wright, 12 Am. Journ. Int. Law, 89.
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against the state offered to aliens in national courts applying international law, such as prize courts, renders such aliens subjects of international law raises a much discussed question. But
in view of the ultimate subordination of such courts to national
legislation we must answer in the negative. 39
The most important subjects of international law are sovereign states, which have recourse against other states by diplomacy, arbitration, reprisals or war. Since the beginning of the
world war the number of sovereign states has been increased.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, and the Hedjaz have been generally recognized and admitted to the League of Nations. Austria-Hungary has ceased to exist, its two components, reduced in
area, have been recognized as independent states. Montenegro
seems to have united with Serbia and much former Austrian territory to form the Serb-Croat-Slovene state commonly called
Jugo-Slavia.40 From the former territory of Russia and Turkey a number of de facto states have grown up, some of which
may ultimately receive general recognition. In this class are
Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia, Ukrainia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Far Eastern Republic and various other governments
4
in Siberia. 1

There has also been a change in the condition of certain states
under special status. Belgium and Luxemburg have been relieved of the neutralization imposed by the treaties of 1839 and
1867 respectively. Luxemburg still regards herself as neutralized
by internal legislation but has agreed to alter this legislation so
as to conform with requirements of the League of Nations Covenant including the duty to permit the passage of troops authorized by the League. 42 Switzerland continues under the neutralization created by the Treaty of 1815 and the League of Nations
has recognized her exemption from any obligation "to take part
3

9Borchard, op. cit. p. 17; Wright, The Enforcement of International
Law, pp. 15-17, 223-228; The Zamora, L. R. [1916] 2 A. C. 77.
40
A useful list of the states of the world is given in Oppenheim, op.
cit. 1:
188.
41
The first seven named applied for admission to the League of
Nations at the meeting of the Assembly, Dec., 1920. Though this was
refused the three Baltic States and Armenia were
admitted to
pation in the technical organizations of the League. In view particithe
hopes of Armenia, Lord Rebert Cecil, representative from South of
Africa,
thought this was "to offer not a stone in place of bread but rather
puff of smoke." (League of Nations Assembly, Provisional Verbatima
Record, 27th Plenary Session, Dec. 16, 1920, pp. 11-12.)
42
Treaty of Versailles, art. 31, 40. League of Nations Assembly,
op. cit. 26th Plenary Session, Dec. 16, 1920, p. 6.
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in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops
43
or the preparation of military operations within her territory."
This exemption is not in reality a reservation since the Treaty
of Versailles of which the League of Nations Covenant44 is a part
Albania
itself recognizes the special status of Switzerland.
cominternational
an
was neutralized under the protection of
45
Her
1913.
in
mission of control on gaining her independence
state
sovereign
a
of
that
status at present, however, appears to be
46
League of Nations.
and as such she has been admitted to the
long
The treaties have given formal sanction to the distinction
47
The
states.
other
and
powers
great
between
existent in fact
Italy,
France,
Empire,
British
The
America,
United States of
and Japan, designated the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
in the treaties are recognized in the former class and if members of the League of Nations are accorded permanent membership in the Council (art. 4). Germany, Austria and Russia on
the other hand have ceased for the time being at least to be
"great powers."
States members of the League of Nations occupy a special
status under the treaties and this status affects not only their relations among each other but also their relations with states not
members of the League. Thus member states are guaranteed
against violation Qf their territorial integrity and existing political
independence by outsiders (Art. X), and may enlist the aid of
the League to compel outsiders to submit controversies to peaceful settlement (Art. XVII). The League of Nations at present
has forty-seven members, thus including all recognized sovereign
states except Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Russia, United States,
Mexico, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Monaco, and Lichtenstein. The
43
League
44

of Nations, Official Journal, (1920) 2: 58.
Art. 435. Furthermore, Swiss neutralization is an "international
and so is
engagement . . . for securing the maintenance of peace"
Swiss Official
expressly recognized by Art. 21 of the Covenant. See Peace
FoundaCommentary, printed in the League of Nations, World
of Swiss
tion, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 151-152, (June, 1920). See also Message
Federal Council to the Federal Assembly, Feb. 17, 1920, International
Conciliation, No. 152, pp. 321, 325, (July, 1920).
45Mehemed Bey Konitza, The Albanian Question, reprinted from the
767, (May, 1919).
Adriatic Review, International Conciliation, No. 138, p. Y.
1919, pp. 56-59.
Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, N.
46League of Nations Assembly, op. cit. 28th Plen. Sess., Dec. 17,
1920, pp. 3-10.
47
Lawrence, Principles of International Law, secs. 113-115. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law, Cambridge, 1920. Chap.
VIII. Oppenheim, op. cit. sec. 116 denies that there is a difference in
legal status.

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

protectorates of Andorra, San Marino, Iceland, Danzig, Egypt,
Tunis, Morocco, Mongolia and Thibet are not members
of the
League of Nations though their protecting powers are
in
each
case members. 48 On the other hand, five self-governing
and partially self-governing colonies of the British Empire, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India are full members
of
the League and have therefore become subjects of international
49

law.

The League of Nations is itself an entity which can
enter
into direct relations with outside states as well as its
members
and is therefore a subject of international law. As Oppenheim
emphasizes, it "is in every respect an international person
sui
generis, something not to be likened to anything else,
for it is
neither a state nor a federal state (Bundesstaat), not
a confederation of states (Staatenbund), nor a mere alliance." o
Although the treaties accord special rights and privileges
to
peoples under a mandatory, and to individuals, racial
minorities
and national groups in various East European States,
and although the League of Nations guarantees these rights
and priv"
ileges, ' these entities have not been made subjects of
international law. None of these individuals, racial minorities
or national groups have a direct method of enforcing there rights
and
privileges but must in each case get an independent state
to champion their cause. Thus the Roumanian treaty provides :52
"Roumania agrees that any member of the Council
League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the of the
attention
of the council any infraction, or any danger of infraction,
of
of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon any
such action and give such direction as it may deem proper take
and
effective in the circumstances."
Though article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant
recognizes that "the wishes of these communities [to be
put under
class A mandates] must be a principal consideration in
the selection of the mandatory" it makes no provision for appeal
by rep48
For list of states and protectorates with discussion of
their status,

see 1 Oppenheim, 167, 188.
49Annex to Art. 26, League of Nations
Oppenheim, op. cit.
1:170; and Allin, 4 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW,Covenant,
117, 190, (Jan. Feb. 1920).
These Colonies have

access to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 14 Supp. Am. Journ. of Int. Law, 378.
50
Oppenheim, op. cit. 1: 269.
5"League of Nations, Official Journal, 1920, 2: 55-56.
52
- Art. 12, 14 Supp. Am. Journ. Int. Law, 329. Similar provisions
are
in the treaties with Poland (art. 12), Czecho-Slovakia
(art. 14), and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene State (art. 11).
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resentatives of these communities to any organ of the League.
The mandatory power and not the people under the mandate
makes an annual report to the mandate commission.
Furthermore, although the principle of national self-determination was applied in arranging boundaries in the enemy terreritory,53 and though plebiscites were provided for in several
sense
51
any
in
not
were
groups
gions, yet unrecognized national
accorded a status under international law. They may, however,
to
appeal to the League of Nations by persuading a member state
deCovenant
the
of
XI
champion their cause. Thus Article
League
clares it "to be the friendly right of each member of the
any
Council
the
of
or
to bring to the attention of the Assembly
which
relations
international
circumstances whatever affecting
understanding
threatens to disturb international peace or the good
PolFrederick
Sir
depends."
between nations upon which peace
the
of
consideration
lock says, with reference to international

Irish question :
namely
"There is only one way in which this could happen,
Irishdeclare
should
States
that the government of the United
Irein
claims
nationalist
unsatisfied
with
American sympathy
between
understanding
land to be capable of disturbing good
a possible event if
Great Britain and the United States. That is
but it is more
time,
a solution is not reached within a reasonable
States would
United
the
from
intimation
likely that a confidential
but avoid the
Council
the
to
reference
formal
precede
only
not
necessity for it."
authorized by
The Permanent Court of International Justice
provided for
and
article XIV of the League of Nations Covenant
of right"
"open
is
in detail by the Geneva meeting of the Assembly
and
Covenant,
the
only to the states mentioned in the Annex to
Nations.
of
League
to such others as shall subsequently enter the
to it" under condiaccess
"have
however,
may,
states"
"Other
56
No provision
League.
tions determined by the Council of the
effect from
in
of justice
is made, as in the Central American court
Court, for
Prize
1907 to 1917 and in the proposed International
suits begun by private individuals.
Conference, Cam53Haskins and Lord, Some Problems of the Peace
bridge, 1920, pp. 19-20.
54Schleswig, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Silesia, Saar Valley, Eupen,
See Haskins and Lord,
Malmedy, Teschen, Zips, Arva, and Klagenfurt.
index.
in
names
these
op. cit. under
This statement assumes
5SPollock, The League of Nations, p. 131.
that the United States is a member of the League.
5614 Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 378.
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Thus the essential subjects of international law are still sovereign states, although the implications of sovereignty have been
somewhat modified. The League of Nations unquestionably tends
to decrease the rights and powers of its members and to increase
their obligations and responsibilities, with the purpose, however,
of better securing those rights and of enlarging the capacity of
each to exercise its powers.
"By accepting the League, states recognize that their existence depends upon the general maintenance of law, and consequently that they must prefer the claim of that law for defense,
as against the lure of an immediate national profit.5 7 Thus,
though international law will continue to aim at'preserving the
independence and autonomy of states, it must be assumed that its
own preservation is more important. It follows that international
law can no longer be conceived by text writers as a series of deductions from an assumed fundamental right of states to exist.
The responsibility of states to assure the existence of the law
will have to be conceived as even more -fundamental.' ' 5 7
THE OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The extent to which states can actually exercise their subjective sovereignty can be ascertained by examining their jurisdiction or the control which they in fact exercise over material things,
called by Oppenheim "the objects of international law" and classifiable as territory, individuals and the high seas. 8 The dominating conception of international law since the peace of Westphalia has been that territory must be under the exclusive and
complete jurisdiction of one state.5 9 Conditions of joint jurisdiction and partial jurisdiction have been rare.60 The principle
of exclusive and complete territorial jurisdiction is recognized in
the League of Nations Covenant by the guarantee of "territorial
integrity" and "existing political independence" to members
of
the League (Art. X) and by the exclusion from consideration in
the Council or Assembly of disputes "arising out of a matter
which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of either party (Art. XV, par. 8). However, the treaties
contain a number of specific exceptions to this principle. Thus
a number of rivers of Europe are put under control of inter57

Wright, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 556, (Nov., 1919).
sOppenheim, op. cit. Part II, sec. 290.
59M1aine, Ancient Law. pp. 103-112; Westlake, Collected Papers,
pp.
133-134; Hall, op. cit. p. 19; Borchard, op. cit. pp. 3-6;
Wright, Enforcement60of International Law, p. 21.
See 1 Cobbett, Leading Cases in International Law, 110-116; Hicks,
The New 'World Order, N. Y. 1920, pp. 185-192; Sayre,
Experiments in
International Administration, pp. 56, 79, 92.
5
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national commissions and are thus removed to a certain extent
from the jurisdiction of the states through which they flow. This
is by no means a new departure since the internationalization of
rivers and other means of transport has been provided by treaties
since 1815.61 The internationalization of two areas of territory,
Dantzig and the Saar valley, is a more novel experiment. These
areas are under a virtual protectorate of the League of Nations,
Dantzig permanently and the Saar valley for fifteen years, at
which time a plebiscite will be taken on the question of maintenance of the existing regime, union with France or union with
Germany.62 The system of colonial mandates contemplates a
limited jurisdiction by the mandatory power in the territory under
the mandate. The League of Nations Covenant itself states the
important limitations which the mandatory power must observe
in behalf of the native population and other members of the
League. These limitations will be specified in detail in the docuof
ment conferring the mandate which is exercised "in behalf
actCouncil
the
of
supervision
the
to
the League" and is subject
(art.
ing with the advice of a permanent mandatory commission
22).63

Aside from these specific exceptions from the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of certain states, several general principles
are accepted by parties to the treaties which limit their discretion in matters hitherto regarded as domestic. These limitations,
it should be emphasized, are not detailed rules but general principles which the states accept as a guide for future legislation and
treaty making. They relate to such matters as the regulation of
railroads and other means of transit (art. 23e),64 the protection
of racial and national minorities and native populations (art.

.6
lim23b),15 the maintenance of labor standards, (art. 23a), the
op. cit. pp. 192-197; Sayre, op. cit. pp. 38, 88, 131.
61licks,
62
Treaty of Versailles, arts. 100-108; 46-47 and arts. 16-40 of annex
of
following art. 50. For organization of governments see League
Nations Official Journal, 2: 45-55.
63See also Memorandum of the Secretary General on Mandates, July
5, 1920,
30, 1920; Reports of M. Hymans adopted by the Council, Aug.
Commission
and Oct. 26, 1920, and Constitution of Permanent Mandates
3, 4, 10, 14 in
approved by the Council Dec. 1, 1920, printed as annexes
from League
League of Nations Assembly Document, No. 161, reprinted
op. cit. pp. 176-185.
Hicks,
also
See
Journal.
Official
of Nations
64See also special regulations on German Railways, arts. 365-369,
372-374.
65Special treaties with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene state deal with this subject. Supra note 4. the Treaty
66A special labor organization is set up by Part XIII of
of Versailles, arts. 387-426, and a labor bill of rights is included as art.
427.
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itation of the white slave and opium traffic (art. 23c), the limitation of armaments (art. 8),67 the control of arms traffic (art.
23d),8 s and the prevention of disease (art. 23f).
Second only in importance to the conception of exclusive and
complete territorial jurisdiction has been that of the complete
jurisdiction of a state over its citizens or nationals. The privileges guaranteed to natives in mandate territory by the League
of Nations can not be regarded as limiting the jurisdiction of
states over their nationals because these natives do not in reality
owe allegiance to the mandate power,6" but the similar privileges
guaranteed to racial and national minorities in certain states of
Eastern Europe is such a limitation, for which precedents may
be found in the treaty of Berlin, of 1878.0 The privilege accorded in most cases to the inhabitants of transferred territory to
choose their nationality and to migrate is in accord with most
cession treaties of recent times. 7 ' The rights of labor (art. 23a)
and native races (art. 23b) stated as general principles in the
treaties would seem to somewhat limit the jurisdiction of the
contracting' states over their subjects. The doctrine of racial
equality proposed by Japan, and which if accepted in good faith
might have had a radical effect on the power of states to discriminate in legislating for their nationals, was rejected.
The freedom of the seas or the absence of national jurisdiction
on the high seas in time of peace except over national vessels has
been accepted as international law since the controversies of Selden and Grotius in the seventeenth century focussed the issue.
The United States has always been an ardent protagonist of free67German military, naval and air forces are reduced and subjected
to an interallied commission of control by Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, arts. 159-213. "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armament of all nations Germany undertakes
strictly to observe" these clauses.
68
A special treaty for the control of traffic in arms, signed by most
of the powers at St. Germain, Sept. 10, 1919, was endorsed by the League
of Nations assembly, 22nd Plenary Session, Dec. 14, 1920, p. 3.
69"A mandatory on behalf of the League" does not enjoy sovereignty
over the inhabitants, though by art. 127 of the treaty of Versailles the
"native inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall
be
entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories!'
70See guarantee of minority rights by treaty of Berlin in Bulgaria
(arts. 5, 8), Montenegro (arts. 27, 30), Serbia (arts. 37, 39), Roumania
(arts. 44, 50), and Turkey (arts. 41, 42). See recent treaties supra
note 7165.
Treaty of Versailles, arts. 37, 85, 91, 106, 113. Full option of nationality is not permitted in Alsace-Lorraine, Annex following art. 79
and art. 278. See also treaties supra note 65.
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dom of the seas asserting with success that it implies co6peration
for the suppression of pirates like the Barbary Corsairs, acceptance of the flag as prima facie evidence of the nationality of vessels, and free access to landlocked seas through straits like the
Danish sounds. 72 The treaties increase freedom of the seas
in time of peace by assuring free access to the sea through inter73
nationalized rivers and ports. The objects for which a free
sea has been sought are also promoted by the guarantees for an
open door to members of the league in various undeveloped regions (art. 22, 23e).
Freedom of the seas in time of war has been subject to such
varied interpretations that no assured meaning can be assigned
to the phrase. In law, however, it would seem to mean that belligerents may interfere with enemy and neutral navigation of the
high seas to the extent that international law permits and no
more. Controversy has arisen because the indefiniteness of the
law in this respect has left a wide margin for the play of national
policies. The belligerent assertion of maritime jurisdiction during the war beyond that heretofore recognized, by the sowing of
mine fields, the proclamation of submarine war zones, the practice of routing and searching neutral vessels in port and the extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade aroused
neutral protest but was not dealt with by the treaty. The covenant appears to contemplate an extreme use of commercial block16) a
ade in wars authorized by the League of Nations (art.
74
point.
second
Wilson's
President
with
accord
in
method
In general the effect of the war on the objects of international
law has been to limit the exclusive and complete jurisdiction of
states over territory and persons. The interest of the family of
nations as organized in the League has been recognized with reference especially to means of transport and communication, the
72Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, pp. 103-134; Schuyler,
Diplomacy, N. Y. 1886, pp. 193-367.
American
73The Elbe, Oder, Niemen, and Danube are declared international
rivers for portions of their courses. (Art. 331.)
74The Second point of Jan. 8, 1918, suggested "Absolute freedom of
and
navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace
part by interin war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or incovenants."
In
national action for the enforcement of international
pointed
accepting the fourteen points by a note of Nov. 5, 1918, the allies
freedom
out that "clause two relating to what is usually described as the
of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could
not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference."
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protection of peoples liable to oppression and the equality of opportunity for the exploitation of undeveloped regions.
TRANSACTIONS IN THE NORMAL RELATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw

International transactions are usually classified according as
they involve the relations of peace, war, or neutrality. Peace is
the normal relation of states; war and neutrality are abnormal
relations. The established instrumentalities for conducting normal international relations, foreign offices, diplomatic and consular officers, have been added to by the various organs established by the League of Nations. The Assembly and Council of
the League are quasi-diplomatic gatherings the members of which
enjoy the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities (Art. 7).
The Secretariat with its many technical divisions is a central
advisory and clerical organ, while such bodies as the mandates
commission (art. 22), the disarmament commission (art. 9), the
international labor office, (art. 393) etc., are given special supervisorv functions. A permanent international court is authorized
by the Covenant (art. 14) and a detailed code organizing it and
defining its jurisdiction has been accepted by the assembly and
will be effective when ratified by the members of the League.7 5
These new organs, together with the bureaus of existing administrative unions coordinated under the supervision of the League
(art. 24) and the Hague bureau and permanent court of arbitration recognized by it (art. 13), will offer greatly improved facilities for the transaction of international business and the settlement of international controversies.
The most important peaceful transactions of states are the settlement of controversies, the establishment of permanent regulations and obligations, and the transfer of territory. In all of
these matters legal principles seem to be growing up which limit
the former complete liberty of the immediately interested states.
Thus members of the League of Nations are required to submit
controversies to the permanent court, to arbitration, or to conciliation by the Council or Assembly (art. 12), and states not in the
League are virtually compelled similarly to submit controversies
with League members (art. 17). In such cases the award of ar75
League of Nations Assembly, op. cit. 21st Plen. Sess., Dec. 13, 1920,
p. 13. For text submitted by the Council, which however was somewhat
modified by the Assembly see Supp. Am. Journ. Int. Law, 14: 371 (Oct.

1920).
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bitration or of the international court is enforceable by the League
(art. 13), while recommendations of the Council or Assembly
can not be enforced unless unanimous with exception of the parties to the dispute (art. 15), though a delay of nine months from
submission must ensue before war can be resorted to (art. 12).
Thus the former liberty of states to settle their controversies by
force or self help is considerably impaired.
Permanent obligations and regulations are practically always
embodied in written documents called treaties or conventions, but
the value of these instruments depends upon the confidence of the
parties that they will be respected. Maintenance of a scrupulous
respect for treaty obligations, a principle approved in the London
Conference of 187176 and emphasized by its violation on the outbreak of war in 1914,7 7 is declared in the preamble to be one
object of the League of' Nations. To sanction this principle,
treaties entered into by members of the League do not become
bindifng until registered with the Secretariat which forthwith publishes them (art. 18). The members, however, agree not to make
treaties inconsistent with the League Covenant and to abrogate
such treaties already existing (art. 20), though "international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of
peace" are expressly stated to be consistent with the Covenant
(art. 21). To assure necessary adaptation to new conditions and
to avoid a perpetuation of the status quo the assembly is authorized to "advise the reconsideration by members of the league of
treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the
peace of the world" (art. 19). The instrumentalities set up by the
League for the giving of technical advice and for periodic discussion with representatives of other nations will greatly facilitate the making of treaties of permanent benefit. In fact, by the
Covenant itself, the members agree to work for treaties improving
labor conditions, reducing armaments, preventing disease, securing freedom of communication and transit, equitable treatment
for commerce, etc., (arts. 8, 23).
Transfers of territory, heretofore, have been in theory matters
7 s
of concern only to the ceding and acquiring state. In practice
76Hall, op. cit. p. 365. Supra note 19.
77Supra note 20.
78Hall, op. cit. pp. 46-48.
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the interest of the inhabitants has sometimes
been recognized9
and this interest was recognized in the peace
conference which in
general based its allocations of territory
on the principle of self
determination.s" Plebiscites were provided
in several doubtful
regionss' The League of Nations Covenant
recognizes that in
class A mandates "the wishes of these
communities must be a
principal consideration in the selection of
the mandatory" (art.
22).
In practice the interest of neighboring states
has also been a
real influence in limiting the power of states
to cede or acquire
territory. Thus the United States has forbidden
transfers in the
New World except to her 2 and this "regional
understanding"
aspect of the Monroe Doctrine is recognized
in the Covenant
(art. 21).
Finally the interest of the family of nations
as a whole, in
preventing transfers by conquest, which
has been growing in
recognition for a hundred years, 3 has been
stated as law in article
10 of the Covenant by which the members
"undertake to respect
and preserve as against external aggression"
each other's territorial integrity. The family of nations, however,
has an equal interest in preventing the perpetuation of an
undesirable status quo.
This interest in change is given recognition
by a declaration that
it is "the friendly right of each member
of the League to bring
to the attention of the Assembly or of the
Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations
which threatens
to disturb international peace or the good
understanding between
nations upon which peace depends." (art.
11), and by authority
given to the Assembly "from time to time
to advise the reconsideration by members of the League of
treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration
of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the
peace of the world"
(art. 19). Thus it appears that a definite international
law of real
79Ibid., and Wambaugh, A Monograph on
Plebiscites, N. Y. 1920,
p. xxvii.
80
Supra note 53.
slSupra
note 54.
8
2See Pres.
Polk's message on Yucatan, April 29, 1848;
Pres. Grant's
message on St. Domingo, May 31, 1870;
Senate Resolution suggested by
Magdalena Bay incident Aug. 2, 1912, conveniently
collected in A League
of Nations, vol. 1, No. 5 (June 1918).
See also decision of Central
American

Court of Justice on Gulf of Fonseca case, 11 Am.

Journ. nt.
Law,83676, 730, (July 1917).
Wright, 13 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 558-559; Resolution
of Pan-American
Congress, 1890, Moore, Digest 1: 292; Cobbett,
op. cit. 2: 245.
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estate is developing which will substitute legal title and peaceable
transfer, subject to an advisory international eminent domain, for
conquest and holding by force.
The war and peace have tended to increase the importance
of express agreement as a source of international law and to
emphasize the need of definite organization for its sanction. With
reference to the principles of the law itself certain tendencies, still
rather indefinite, are suggested by the foregoing inquiry. From
a subjective standpoint international law tends to recognize that
the enjoyment of sovereignty is conditioned by the assumption of
responsibility for the maintenance of law. Viewed from an objective standpoint it tends to recognize a greater number of concrete limitations upon the jurisdiction of states over their territory and nationals out of consideration for the rights of minorities, freedom of transit and equality of economic opportunity.
Viewed from the standpoint of international intercourse, while
according to states almost complete liberty to settle controversies,
terriestablish permanent international regulations and transfer
definitely
more
tends
law
tory by peaceful means, international
to discountenance the conduct of such transactions by violence.
(To be continued.)

